Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Author Item Excerpt Meta data
McDowell, John
 
Books on Amazon
Intuitionism EMD II 52
Intuitionism/McDowell: rejects bivalence - problem: it cannot make any statement by itself - Solution: separate assertion from bivalence -> then distinguishing between the content of the assertion and the sense of the sentence.
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EMD II 60
Intuitionism VsClassical logic/McDowell: in his view classical logic picks out only those cases as logical truths, which have the property that, after all we know, assume that the connectives (constants) have this meaning - this property ensures not even the truth of sentences that they have - This is all "rolled up from behind." - McDowell: intuitionism does not require a new concept of meaning.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


> Counter arguments against McDowell
> Counter arguments in relation to Intuitionism



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-30