Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intuitionism: A) intuitionism in mathematics assumes that the objects to be inspected, e.g. numbers are only constructed in the process of the investigation and are therefore not ready objects, which are discovered. This has an effect on the double negation and the sentence of the excluded middle. B) Intuitionism of ethics assumes that moral principles are fixed and are immediately (or intuitively) knowable. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J. McDowell on Intuitionism - Dictionary of Arguments
II 52 Intuitionism/McDowell: rejects bivalence. >Bivalence. Problem: it cannot make any statement by itself. Solution: separate assertion from bivalence.-> Then we have a distinction between the content of the assertion and the sense of the sentence. II 60 Intuitionism VsClassical logic/McDowell: in his view classical logic picks out only those cases as logical truths, which have the property that, after all we know, assume that the connectives (constants) have this meaning - this property ensures not even the truth of sentences that they have - This is all "rolled up from behind." - McDowell: intuitionism does not require a new concept of meaning. >Logical constant, >Conncetive, >Sense._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, |
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> Counter arguments against McDowell
> Counter arguments in relation to Intuitionism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19