Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Lewis, David
 
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Causality IV 77
Causality/State/Lewis: A possible world that consisted only of a distribution of states ((s) without the assumed objects) would be causally just like ours. - There are no properties of the actual world except those that supervene on the distribution of local qualities - causality: is determined by nothing except by the distribution of local qualities.
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V 201
Backward/Backwardness/Lewis: only allowed with counterfactual conditionals outside causal contexts - false reverse causality: E.g. to say: if D had not fired, it would have meant that it was not stimulated.
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V 286
Causality/Avoidance: E.g. circuit with exclusive-OR gate: each output signal is partly caused by the absence of a second input signal - then the match is a fluke.
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Schwarz I 131 ~
Causality/Lewis/Schwarz: counterfactual conditionals without causality: E.g. Had I not turned the handle, the window would not have opened - e.g. Had Socrates not died, Xanthippe would not have become a widow - e.g. Had I not written to X, I would not have written to Larry. - Events must not overlap, otherwise, for example, a football match would be caused by its first half ((s) because of counterfactual conditionals).
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Schwarz I 135
Reverse causality/Time/Hausmann/Lewis: E.g. Fred jumps off the bridge - counterfactual: what is the next possible worlds in which he does not end up in the water? - Pre-history is the same up to the last moment, then great miracle needed - small wonder: if he does not even jump - important argument: then the landing caused the jump! - ((s) Because absence of landing can only be explained by absence of jump?).

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28