Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Armstrong, D.M.
 
Books on Amazon
Causal Relation II 134
Necessary Causal Relation: E.g. square pegs do not fit into round holes in the same way round pegs fit - contingent causal relation: E.g. freezing water expands - (s) if it did not expand, it would still be water and still freezing - frozen. Not defined by volume, but by MiSt
II 154
Humean View/Place: Logical Relation like Necessity/contingent only between propositions - Causal Relation only between actual and individual situations - Situation: a) States (properties do not change) b) Event: (properties change) - causal necessity: matter of counterfactual conditionals - in nature no logical necessity (de re, HumeVsKripke) - causal necessity special case of logical necessity - statements about causal necessity always contingent if their denial does not make them contradictory - Situations are separated
II 155
Dispositional Properties/Place: are needed, because we speak about sentences with causal relations, not about their truthmakers - the dispositional statement provides the premise - the truth of a proposition depends on the situation as truthmaker, but truthmaker cannot simply consist in juxtaposition of cause and effect - otherwise, precisely the necessary connection that provides the counterfactual conditional would be omitted - the contingency refers to causal statements, not to relations between situations.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-23