|Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions.|
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|Description|| I 3
Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory - Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of description - 1) explanatory power (of laws) The semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality.
Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law - Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be) - Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model - Explanation/Cartwright: is not a guide to the truth.
Description/Laws of Nature/LoN/Physical Laws/Cartwright: E.g. the gravitation law does not describe the behavior of the objects, because electrical forces also play a role - (Coulomb's law) - no charged body behaves according to G. L. - And every massive body is a counter-E.g. to Coulomb's law - Solution: "... if no other forces..." - without ceteris paribus.
Description/Physics/Cartwright: false: that we have to depart from existence assumptions to come to a description according to which we can set up the equations - correct: the theory has only few principles to move from descriptions to equations - these principles certainly require structured information - and the "descriptions" on the right side have to satisfy many mathematical requirements. - The best descriptions are those that best match the equations.
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983