## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
---|---|---|---|

Field, Hartry Books on Amazon |
Counterfactual Conditionals | I 220 Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./FieldVsCounterfactual Conditional: It is too vague for physical theories or geometric concepts. - DummettVsCounterfactual Conditionals: they cannot be "barely true". - They need (without counterfactual conditionals) ascertainable facts as truth makers. - Substantivalism/Field: can guarantee that situations where distances differ also differ in non-counterfactual aspects. - FieldVsRelationism: cannot. FieldVsCounterfactual Conditionals: no theory about counterfactually defined relations works if these relations cannot be defined non-counterfactually as well. - (This is why they cannot be "barely true"). - These counterfactual conditionals cannot be derived from counterfactual statements about points in the plane. - Therefore, we must take them as the naked truth. - That would be no problem if you only needed a few of them. I 233 Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./Explanation/Lewis: nothing can counterfactually depend on the non-contigent. - E.g. counterfactually depend on which mathematical entities there are. - Nothing sensible can be said about which of our opinions would be different if the number 17 did not exist. - Since mathematics consists of necessary truths, there can be no explanation problem here. - FieldVsLewis: not all facts in mathematics are necessary - e.g. number of planets. |
Fie I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Fie II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Fie III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 |

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26