Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Field, Hartry
Books on Amazon
Counterfactual Conditionals I 220
Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./FieldVsCounterfactual Conditional: It is too vague for physical theories or geometric concepts. - DummettVsCounterfactual Conditionals: they cannot be "barely true". - They need (without counterfactual conditionals) ascertainable facts as truth makers. - Substantivalism/Field: can guarantee that situations where distances differ also differ in non-counterfactual aspects. - FieldVsRelationism: cannot.
FieldVsCounterfactual Conditionals: no theory about counterfactually defined relations works if these relations cannot be defined non-counterfactually as well. - (This is why they cannot be "barely true"). - These counterfactual conditionals cannot be derived from counterfactual statements about points in the plane. - Therefore, we must take them as the naked truth. - That would be no problem if you only needed a few of them.
I 233
Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./Explanation/Lewis: nothing can counterfactually depend on the non-contigent. - E.g. counterfactually depend on which mathematical entities there are. - Nothing sensible can be said about which of our opinions would be different if the number 17 did not exist. - Since mathematics consists of necessary truths, there can be no explanation problem here. - FieldVsLewis: not all facts in mathematics are necessary - e.g. number of planets.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26