Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Lewis, David
 
Books on Amazon
Counterfactual Conditionals V 5
Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./Lewis: variably strict conditional: if there are closer possible worlds, disregard the more distant ones.
---
V 5f
Counterfactual conditionals/Negation/Lewis: from "would" through "could" (not): with logical antecedent and negated consequent - from "could": with "would" with the same A and negated consequent.
---
V 10
Counterfactual conditionals:
Analysis 0: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true every A-World, so that __".
Analysis 1: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true in the (accessible) A-world closest to i if there is one.
A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C i is true in every (accessible) A-World closest to i.
Analysis 1 1/2: A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C is true in a specific, arbitrarily selected (accessible) A-World closest to i - Analysis 3: A were>>would C is true in the world i if a (accessible) AC-World is closer to i than any A~C-world.
"Def A were>>could C is true in i iff for every (accessible) A~C-world there is an AC-world, which is at least as close to i, and if there are (accessible) A-worlds.
---
V 8
Counterfactual conditionals/Negation: here: through "could" in the rear part -"E.g.~(A were>>would C) equi A were>>could ~C-" ((s) could = not necessarily"). - That will do for
Analysis 2: ... true in every next possible world ...- then Bizet/Verdi: not necessarily French and not necessarily non-French... etc. - "all true" false: not necessarily French-and-Italian...- that is ok.
---
V 14
Definition counterfactual conditionals: = variably strict conditional; i.e. if there is a closer possible world, disregard the more distant ones - (see below V 22, see above V 5).
---
V 18
Counterfactual Conditional: I use it when the antecedent is probably wrong - Counterfactual Conditionals are more like the material conditional - with true antecedent are only true if the consequent is true - Problem: the Counterfactual Conditional with true antecedent are difficult to determine - they are in fact inappropriate! - Assuming someone unknowingly expressed such: - then both are convincing:
a) A, ~C, ergo ~(A were>>would C: wrong, because A but not C,
b) A, C, ergo A were>>would C.: true, because A and in fact C- Important argument: this depends on the adequacy of "because" - Lewis: I think a) is more appropriate (should be assumend to be true) - Definition centering assumption: is thus weakened: every world is self-accessible and at least so similar to itself as any other world is with it - so a) is valid, but b) is invalid -" Centering assumption: (see below V 42): if it was violated, worlds which deviate in a neglected way would count the same as the actual world).
---
V 18
Actual world/Counterfactual conditionals: if you want to distinguish the actual world in Counterfactual Conditionals, you can do that by expanding the comparative similarity of possible worlds so that they also include certain impossible worlds where not too impossible antecedents are true - Vs: but they are even worse than the impossible borderline worlds (see above).
---
V 25
Counterfactual conditionals/Axioms:.. system C1 the Counterfactual Conditional implies the implication "were A>>would B. >. A>B" (s) That is the Counterfactual Conditional is stronger than the implication - AB >.were A>>would B. - that is, from the conjunction follows the counterfactual conditional.
---
V 62
Counterfactual conditional: needs similarity between worlds to be comparable.
Analysis 1/A1: (VsLewis) without similarity - counterfactual dependence/Lewis: always causal and thus consisting mostly in chronological order.
---
V 62
Counterfactual conditional: antecedent normally assumed to be wrong - with assumed true antecedent.
---
V 95/96
Counterfactual conditional: Advantage: not truth-functionally established - either both antecedent and consequent or neither applies in a possible world.
---
V 179
Counterfactual conditional: are not transitive - therefore there is no specific course of increase or decrease of probability through a causal chain.
---
V 284
Backwards/Counterfactual conditional: there is counterfactual dependence in the backward direction, but no causal dependency: false "if the effect had been different, the cause would have been something else" - ((s)> genetic fallacy?).
---
V 288
Probabilistic counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Form: if A were the case, there would be this and this chance for B.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Counterfactual Conditionals



> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-01