Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Putnam, Hilary
Books on Amazon
Counterfactual Conditionals III 93
Counterfactual Conditionals/Putnam: what possible situations are relevant?
I 187ff
Counterfactual Conditionals/PutnamVsLewis: but there are situations in which it is simply not true that B would not have happened if A had not happened.
II 201
E.g. B could have been caused by another cause - E.g. identical twins: it is true that both always have the same hair color - but the hair of one is not the cause of the hair of the other - Lewis cannot separate that - Counterfactual Conditionals/Mackie: depends on the knowledge level - statement which conclusions from it are allowed - Knowledge: only "the match was lit" nothing more - Counterfactual Conditionals/Sellars: has assertibility conditions, no truth conditions.
Counterfactual Conditionals/Lewis: (follows Stalnaker): truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals with possible worlds and similarity metrics. - Putnam: an ontology with possible worlds is not materialistic. - PutnamVs: the similarity metrics must not be intrinsic (with mind-independent decision on relevance), otherwise the world would be like a mind itself. PutnamVsLewis: this is idealism, and that might not only be gradually true. - False: to say "It's all physical, except this similarity metrics".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24