Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Field, Hartry
Books on Amazon
Conditional II 253
Conditional/Deflationism/Field: the nonfactualist view is not the only one possible, both classical and non-classical logic can be used. - Disquotational truth: it seems to require truth conditions. - E.g. "If Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito will become President" is true iff Clinton dies in office and de Vito becomes President.
II 254
Conditional/Facts/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984): Thesis: the conditional facts are not expressible in 1st order logic, but in indicative "If .. then .." clauses.
II 255
Conditional/Factualism/Field: 1st Variant: assumes that "if A, then B" has the same truth conditions as "~A v B" - Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - Non-factualism: seems committed to them.
II 255
Material Conditional/Paradoxes of Material Implication/Jackson/Field: Best Solution: (Jackson 1979): Thesis: counterintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Thesis: the conclusions are not assertible, but nevertheless they are true. - There is a conventional implicature for that when we assert "if A, then B", that not only the probability P (A> B) is high, but also the conditional probability P (A> B I A). - Point/Field: the requirement that P(A > B I A) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the nonfactualist that P(B I A) is high - "Surface logic" has to do with assertibility - "Deep logic": says what is truth preserving.
II 256
Factualism: must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e. on the surface) and the acceptability on a deep level - Deflationism: in the same way the deflationism can then distinguish between non-factualism and factualism without using the concepts "true" or "fact" - factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - non-factualism: seems committed to them.
II 257
Non-Factualism/Field: must assume that the acceptance of conditionals is not regulated by the normal probability laws governing the acceptance of "fact sentences".

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25