## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
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Field, Hartry Books on Amazon |
Conditional | II 253 Conditional/Deflationism/Field: the nonfactualist view is not the only one possible, both classical and non-classical logic can be used. - Disquotational truth: it seems to require truth conditions. - E.g. "If Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito will become President" is true iff Clinton dies in office and de Vito becomes President. II 254 Conditional/Facts/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984): Thesis: the conditional facts are not expressible in 1st order logic, but in indicative "If .. then .." clauses. II 255 Conditional/Factualism/Field: 1st Variant: assumes that "if A, then B" has the same truth conditions as "~A v B" - Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - Non-factualism: seems committed to them. II 255 Material Conditional/Paradoxes of Material Implication/Jackson/Field: Best Solution: (Jackson 1979): Thesis: counterintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Thesis: the conclusions are not assertible, but nevertheless they are true. - There is a conventional implicature for that when we assert "if A, then B", that not only the probability P (A> B) is high, but also the conditional probability P (A> B I A). - Point/Field: the requirement that P(A > B I A) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the nonfactualist that P(B I A) is high - "Surface logic" has to do with assertibility - "Deep logic": says what is truth preserving. II 256 Factualism: must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e. on the surface) and the acceptability on a deep level - Deflationism: in the same way the deflationism can then distinguish between non-factualism and factualism without using the concepts "true" or "fact" - factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - non-factualism: seems committed to them. II 257 Non-Factualism/Field: must assume that the acceptance of conditionals is not regulated by the normal probability laws governing the acceptance of "fact sentences". |
Fie I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Fie II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Fie III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 |

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25