Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Conditional: A conditional in logic is a statement that asserts a relationship between two propositions, typically in an "if-then" format. It states that if the antecedent is true, then the consequent must also be true. In contrast to (purely formal) implication, the conditional refers to the content of the propositions. See also Implication._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Conditional - Dictionary of Arguments
V 145 Definition Stalnaker-conditional/Lewis: A>C (pointed) is true iff the least possible change that makes A true also makes C true - (least possible revision). Lewis: the probability of Stalnaker-conditionals are usually not equal to the conditional probability. V 146 Stalnaker-conditional/Truth conditions/Lewis: T(A>C)) WA(C) if A is possible. V 148 Conditional/Credibility/Belief/Stalnaker: in order to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1) add an antecedent to the set of beliefs - 2) minimal corrections for consistency - 3) decide whether the consequent is true - LewisVsStalnaker: that is just conditionalization and not representation. V 153 Indicative conditional/assertibility/probability/Jackson/Lewis: the discrepancy between the assertibility of P (C I A) and the probability of the truth of P (A>C) lies with one or the other Gricean >implicature. - The right of access to this implicature must depart from the premise that the conditional has the truth conditions of the (truth-functional) A ⊃ C (horseshoe). - (Lewis pro). - Implicature: E.g. "here you are right" (but mostly you are wrong). >Assertibility. V 154 Indicative conditional/Lewis: is a truth-functional conditional that conventionally implies robustness (insensitivity to new information) in terms of the antecedent - hence the probability of both conditionals must be high - therefore the assertibility of the indicative conditional comes with the corresponding conditional probability. - maxim: "assert the stronger one"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Conditional
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19