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Definition Stalnaker-conditional/Lewis: A>C (pointed) is true iff the least possible change that makes A true also makes C true - (least possible revision). Lewis: the probability of Stalnaker-conditionals are usually not equal to the conditional probability.
Stalnaker-conditional/Truth conditions/Lewis: T(A>C)) WA(C) if A is possible.
Conditional/Credibility/Belief/Stalnaker: in order to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1) add an antecedent to the set of beliefs - 2) minimal corrections for consistency - 3) decide whether the consequent is true - LewisVsStalnaker: that is just conditionalization and not representation.
Indicative conditional/assertibility/probability/Jackson/Lewis: the discrepancy between the assertibility of P (C I A) and the probability of the truth of P (A>C) lies with one or the other Grice implicature. - The right of access to this implicature must depart from the premise that the conditional has the truth conditions of the (truth-functional) A>C (horseshoe) - (Lewis pro). - Implicature: E.g. "here you are right" (but mostly you are wrong).
Indicative conditional/Lewis: is a truth-functional conditional that conventionally implies robustness (insensitivity to new information) in terms of the antecedent - hence the probability of both conditionals must be high - therefore the assertibility of the indicative conditional comes with the corresponding conditional probability. - maxim: "assert the stronger one".
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991