Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Wright, Crispin
 
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Conditional I 54
Minimalism/Logic/Conditional: we cannot ask for more than for a statement to obviously appear as a conditional. Wright: there are no "deeper" notions of a "real" conditional tense" or "deeper" notion of an assertoric content.
For our purposes, surface features suffice, even though it were certainly be possible to fix the corresponding features.
  (s) in particular, no metaphysical assumptions about a "true-making realm" are necessary.
Expression theory: must make a distinction between genuine and merely apparent conditionals:
  e.g. genuine conditional: If it rains tomorrow, the visit is canceled
  e.g. apparent conditional: If you behave badly, the visit is canceled.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25