Books on Amazon
|Counterfactual Dependence||V 33
Counterfactual dependence/Time/Lewis: counterfactually dependent: assumptions about the future - not counterfactual dependence: assumptions about the past - but: if the present was very different, the past would have had to be different somehow! - Lewis: Thesis: yet no strict asymmetry: - E.g. A is not going to ask B for a favor after a dispute - variant: a) if he asks him, there was no dispute - b) there was definitely a fight - backwards causality/past: Problem: counterfactual conditionals/Co.co. are always vague - e.g. Caesar in the Korean War: would have a) detonated the nuclear bomb - b) used a catapult - solution: special form: if A should ask today, there would not have been a controversy yesterday- normal cases in contrast: here there is the asymmetry.
Alternative/Counterfactual dependence/Causing/Lewis: Analysis 1: Problem: we have to assume a transition period when comparing alternatives. - Because we do not allow jumps - for this transition period the counterfactual dependence does not apply. - Solution: we need an assumption for a certain period of time and a standard solution for vagueness - Analysis 2: comparative similarity of possible worlds - Definition truth/Co.co./Lewis: a Counterfactual Conditional is true if every world that makes the antecedent true also makes the consequent true without leaving the reality for no reason.
Definition counterfactual dependency/Dependent/conD/Lewis: if there is a family of As, A1, A2 and of Cs, C1, C2, ... and if all Counterfactual Conditionals - wA1>wC1, ... wA2>wC2, etc., then the Cs are counterfactually dependent on the As - typical: E.g. measurements and perceptions - E.g. conD, but not causal dependency. E.g. assumed changed laws of gravity with alternative planet movements - because there are no separated events.
Causality/Causal dependency/Separated/Separation/Separatedness/Distinct/Lewis: General: (s) Hume?) causD can only exist between separate entities.) - Solution: Instead, counterfactual dependence: if Socrates had not been conceived, his death would have been impossible.
Schwarz I 136
Cause/Causing/Counterfactual dependence/Lewis/Schwarz: cD: B is happily cD when probability for B without the occurrence of A would have been significantly lower (relative to a time after the actual occurrence of A). - 137 transitivity: Problem: accident causes recovery - fragility: different standards for effect/Cause: Cause: robust: Later throwing also cause, but effect fragile: someone else throws:> different breaking.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005