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|Conventions||Meg I 464
Convention/Lewis/Walker: is present only when alternatives are also conventions - something is only not a c if the parties cannot imagine that other kinds of speech are possible - Convention/Walker: in individual cases you cannot figure out whether the context between antecedent and consequent is secured conventionally or conversationally.
Lewis II 222
Convention/Lewis: not just assignment of meaning, but detour over action/expectation.
A convention in the sense we have defined here is a regularity of conduct. (And belief). It is essential that the regularity on the part on others is a reason to behave yourself compliantly.
VsLewis: Truthfulness and trust (here not in L) cannot be a convention. Which alternatives might be there to general truthfulness - untruthfulness perhaps? ((s) Background: Conventions must be contingent.)
LewisVs: The Convention is not the regularity of truthfulness and trust absolutely. It is in a particular language. Its alternatives are regularities in other languages.
Therefore a convention persists, because everyone has reason to stick to it if others do, that is the commitment.
Meg I 479 ff
Definition conventions/Lewis: a practice is only a convention, if it has alternatives, which in turn are conventions. Something can only be no convention, if the parties cannot imagine that other, less natural ways of speaking are possible. Walker in Grice, Meg I 479 ff
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991