Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Putnam, Hilary
Books on Amazon
Convention T I 66
Truth/PutnamVsTarski: his convention theory does not clarify the concepts of truth and reference, because it uses the concepts of the "designation" of a sentence and of "following from something" - these are (too?) closely related to truth and reference. - PutnamVsSellars: his analysis of the designation is not helpful: "wheel" plays the role of "Rad" in English. - This is not a description of the role, but the name of the role! - ((s) Those who know neither of both know nothing.)
II 89f
Definition Convention Theory/Tarski/Putnam: the requirement that all sentences from the language S are equivalent with the corresponding sentence of the metalanguage MS. - Putnam: this only determines the extension of "true" only when the connectives are interpreted classically and not intuitionistically. - Intuitionistically it would be about "provable". - Tarski: "electron refers" is equivalent to "There are electrons". - Intuitionistically: there is a description D, so that "D is an electron" is provable in B1 - That could be true with the appropriate theory, even if there are no electrons. - Intuitionism: here, existence is intra-theoretical.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26