Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Armstrong, D.M.
Books on Amazon
Conceptualism II 25
Def Conceptualism/Place: (PlatoVs, Aristotle pro, Place pro). Everything belongs to one of these 4 categories: 1) concrete particular 2) property of a particular 3) situation 4) property of a situation (II 31 also property of a property e.g. syntactic relations within a sentence are relations between words - Def words: consist in certain formal properties either of an event (of vocal expression) or particular: (characters) II 26 Conceptualism: i.e. there are no abstractions such as numbers, sets or laws of nature (as states in the world, only as formulas that describe something - Universals/Conceptualism: exist in two respects: 1) in the sense in which its instances exist (they really occur) 2) in the sense that living organisms are predisposed to classify particulars, and that the classifications are represented in the semantic conventions of natural language - i.e. as abstractions due to similarities between particulars
II 49
ConceptualismVsAbstractions/Place: VsNominalization of "fragility" in subject position - VsPossible Worlds - II 56 but does not deny universals
II 110
Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar, so that they can be "of the same kind" - in this sense they cannot be "inexactly" similar
U/Species/Conceptualism/Place: U not in addition to the similarities between their instantiations - solution: "species", "U": viewed from the perspective of the object: which properties do the particulars need to have - "concept", "intention": affect the disposition of the mind for classification

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-23