Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Tugendhat, Ernst
Books on Amazon
Conceptualism I 72f
Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p" (>facts?) - VsObject Theory - VsConceptualism (concepts for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure) - TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion.
I 91
VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings"
I 184f
Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis - I 185 Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete idea.
NominalismVsConceptualism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual - NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations.-
I 189
VsConceptualism: object dispensable - Nominalism: 1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous? - 2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning.
I 204
Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color".

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

> Counter arguments against Tugendhat
> Counter arguments in relation to Conceptualism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-25