Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Correctness, Logik: is a property of systems or calculi, not of conclusions. A system is correct when all the statements provable in it are true. The system is complete when all valid statements in it are also provable. Completeness and correctness are complementary; they are complementing each other to adequacy. (R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Philosophische Logik, Paderborn, 2002).
B. Correctness, accuracy, philosophy contrary to the concept of truth, the concept of accuracy refers to an implicitly or explicitly presupposed rule system, which is fulfilled or not fulfilled. While truth is something that is attributed or denied to sentences, accuracy is rather applied to actions - also verbal acting - as well as to illustrations. Unlike truth, accuracy allows gradations. See also truth, truth conditions, indeterminacy, systems, theory, fulfillment, satisfiability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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M. Dummett on Correctness - Dictionary of Arguments
II 83 Correctness: below truth conditions: simplest assertions: we can distinguish situations where they are correct or incorrect. No knowledge of the truth conditions required. - ((s) E.g. polite lie: you may not even know if it is a lie.) >Truth conditions, >Situations, >Assertions. II 124 Correctness/Dummett: is not a basic concept for assertions - Assertions are no answers. II 125 Instead: incorrectness as the basic concept: this includes undecidable cases - even for names without a bearer. >Proper names. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16