Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Def: truth as correspondence with objects in the world. See also mapping relation, representation.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Davidson, Donald
 
Books on Amazon
Correspondence Theory Rorty I 328
Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson it is a relation without ontological preferences, it can connect any words with any object! Nature prefers no mode of presentation! (VsAnthropic Principle).
Rorty VI 134
Correspondence: does not add anything enlightening to the simple concept of being true. Perhaps we should rather say "mostly true" and admit that people have different views on questions of detail.
Match/Correspondence/Davidson / Rorty: does not add anything intelligible to the concept of "being true".
- - -
Horwich I 497
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/VsCausal Theory of Reference/DavidsonVsKripke: if, conversely, reference were fixed by a physical relation, the correspondence between the two correspondences would need an explanation - because according to causal theory it would be possible that we often refer to things that we cannot reliably report - then it would be an empirical ((s) contingent) fact that our beliefs are mostly true.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994


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> Counter arguments in relation to Correspondence Theory



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-30