|Def: truth as correspondence with objects in the world. See also mapping relation, representation.|
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|Correspondence Theory||I 229
Correspondence Theory/Truth/Field: needs an additional concept of the truth theoretical content of psychological states. - And it is used in a way that it cannot occur in the disquotation scheme.
Correspondence Theory/FieldVsCorrespondence Theory: even for an inconsistent theory it is consistent when the the correspondence theory is assumed that it is true, because the logical words in it could have been used differently. - Therefore, the truth of the correspondence theory should not be applied to disquotational truth, because it is a logical concept itself and the instances of disquotation scheme must be regarded as logical truths.
Correspondence Theory/Ontological Commitment/O.C./Quine/Field: the ontological commitment seems to exclude the correspondence theory. - FieldVsQuine: despite the uncertainty we should allow correspondence. - >partial denotation.
Horwich I 416
VsCorrespondence: which one is the right one? - Field: which one is relevant may depend on epistemic values, but not on which values are "correct." - Field pro "epistemic relativism".
RelativismVsSkepticism: the question of the "real" justification does not make sense.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994