Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Nagel, Thomas
 
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Kripke’s Wittgenstein I 66
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/NagelVsKripke: Kripke is more reductionist than Wittgenstein would have wished - "it’s not about (naturalistic) facts from the past -" I 68 solution/Nagel: there are no alternative meanings -" Nagel: but we are still using our language; even in the attempt to assert its impossibility - "I 69, it is possible that some of my words mean nothing, but in order to detect that I have to use other words properly -
I 69/70
Mean/Kripke/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Nagel: problem: the gap between the non-normative and normative. The act of meaning implies the difference between right and wrong answers - behavior, beliefs, dispositional or experience-based facts imply no such consequences - therefore these cannot consist in them -
I 72
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/StrawsonVsKripkeNagel: we understand the language well enough to recognize when inconsistencies are attributable solely to the sense or to the meaning -

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991


> Counter arguments against Nagel
> Counter arguments in relation to Kripke’s Wittgenstein



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-30