Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Schiffer, Stephen
Books on Amazon
Kripke’s Wittgenstein I 174
Belief/Meaning/Fact/Nonfactualism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: there is simply no property that is equivalent to the meaningful predicate "believes that Harvard lies not in Miami", and there is not a fact, that corresponds to the closed sentence that contains the predicate. - Quaddition: for the past, there was not a fact, and a fortiori not for the present. - Problem: it is not true that he meant addition instead of Quaddition. - Solution: - "fact" is ambiguous: pleonastic and non-pleonastic.
I 176
Nonfactualism/Solution: there is no (non-pleonastic) property which is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it. - Direct solution: physicalist reduction - this is impossible when it is abpout meaning (intending).

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Kripke’s Wittgenstein

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-30