Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Wright, Crispin
 
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Kripke’s Wittgenstein I 264ff
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein: no behavior allows us to infer internal rules (in the past) about addition, so there are no rules about meaning, not in the present, therefore, not about truth.
I 269
Kripke’s Wittgenstein: Vs: the skeptical thought confused mention and use by concluding that all that is true of meanings, also applies to truth.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001


> Counter arguments against Wright
> Counter arguments in relation to Kripke’s Wittgenstein



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29