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|Criteria||Cavell I 275
Criteria/Wittgenstein/Cavell: Wittgenstein's criteria do not help to distinguish between genuine and feigned pain. (Only for signs of pain).
Putnam: but they allow me to realize that what I seem to see is a case of pain.
They do not say: the pain is real, but they tell me that I see pain.
Criteria/Behaviorism/Wittgenstein/Cavell/Putnam: If I answer the skeptic, I know that the criteria are fulfilled, because the criteria are determined by the behavior, then my (Putnam's) interpretation Wittgenstein's approaches so much a behaviorist one that I would be forced to call Wittgenstein a behaviourist.
Cavell: we cannot describe the criteria for pain without using the concept of pain.
Putnam: for Cavell, who does not see the function of criteria in granting the permission; to say "I know", the path to a behaviorist Wittgenstein does not open up at all.
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