## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
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Tarski, Alfred Books on Amazon |
Criteria | Horwich I 130 Truth criterion / Criterion / Tarski: we will probably never find one - but equally not for most other concepts including the physics. Tarski I 177 Criterion of truth / Tarski: there is none that shows that there is no wrong record of an empirical theory - ((s) somewhere: criterion not included in the statements themselves - these are all different.) - Tarksi: Commonality of true propositions: truth, not criterion as blackness of the coal and whiteness of the snow - ((s) Arithmetic: the criterion is in the rules here.) - - - Berka I 492 Truth/criterion/structural/Tarski: a structural truth-criterion allows each statement of the language to effectively allocate a statement that is equivalent to them, which, if it is not quantitative, is obviously true or obviously wrong - that works in the class calculus - a structural characteristic of true statements possible if it can be shown that the class of individuals is infinite. - ((s) Because then accuracy/provability coincide). -> general criterion of truth. --- I 502 Criterion of truth/structural/Tarski: is given to us in that we find that the concept of the true statement (from ยง3) and the one of the provable theorem (due to the matrix method) are of the same scope - Problem: this is only true for simple languages - (i.e. with only a single semantic category E.g. only individuals). |
Tarsk I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Hor I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Brk I K. Berka/L. Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-26