Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Searle, John R.
 
Books on Amazon
Artificial Intelligence I 60
Artificial Intelligence/thesis: the mind acts to the brain like the program to hardware - different material structures can be mentally equivalent if they are different hardware versions of the same computer program - the brain is then not important for the mind.
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I 61
SearleVs: Chinese Room.
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I 227
Definition strong artificial intelligence/Searle: mind = program - Definition weak artificial intelligence: brain processes can be simulated with computers - Definition cognitivism: brain = computer.
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I 228
Artificial Intelligence: semantics is completely mirrored in syntax (proof theory) - SearleVs not to decide empirically what is: program, algorithm, computer? (description dependent).
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Perler/Wild I 145
"Strong artificial intelligence"/Searle: Expression of traditional dualism: that the specific neurobiology of the brain is not important.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24