Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Brandom, Robert
 
Books on Amazon
Logic I 164
Logic/Brandom: do not only restrict to formally valid inferences. - BrandomVsFormalism: one should assume silent premises and implicit logic rules with everyone - Dummett: one should not define logical consequences in concepts of logical truth.
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I 167
Achilles and the tortoise/Carroll: however, some inferential definitions must be implied. - There must be rules, not only truths.
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II 47
Tells us something about the conceptual contents task: not proving something - the formal accuracies are derived from the material accuracies, which contain much more non-logical vocabulary.
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I 175
Logic/Frege/Brandom: The task is an expressive one: not to prove something, but to say it - even in science concepts are formed arbitrarily - Goal: not a certain kind of truth but of inferences.
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I 176
Conceptual contents are considered to be identified through their inferential role - which requires that one can speak meaningfully about consequences, even before a specific logical vocabulary is introduced.
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I 542
Logic/Brandom: the use of identity and quantifiers requires the use of singular terms and predicates. Terms (symmetric) must be interchangeable (identity) - predicates (asymmetric) must provide the frame for expressing incompatibilities - BrandomVsFormalism: Accuracies of inference are not always the same as logical correctness.
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II 24
Logic/tradition: bottom-up: from the analysis of the meanings of the singular terms to the judgments.
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II 25
Brandom, New: top-down: Pragmatism: first, the use of terms - ((s) always in complete sentences.)

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begr√ľnden und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28