Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Cresswell, M.J.
Books on Amazon
Logic I 40
Logic/natural language/semantics/Cresswell: not every logic can be taken as the basis of semantics: difference Entailment/Consequence: in the natural language, "Monday follows Sunday" must not be taken as a consequence of "Snow is white" - (only formal, not correct content-wise).
I 42
Logic/Semantics/entailment/meaning postulates/Cresswell: E.g. meaning postulate: (x) (x is bachelor > x is male) - then the conclusion of "roses are red" and "violets are blue" on roses and violets ..and snow is white" becomes valid ((Vs) - /CresswellVsMeaning postulates - false alignment of entailment and consequence - snow is not white in all possible worlds - solution: possible world semantics - difference between necessary and contingent truths - Quine/Cresswell : This seems to reject analytically/synthetically the distinction together with the distinction.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-23