Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Quine, Willard Van Orman
 
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Logical Truth X 87
Logical truth/Quine: always in relation to a particular language, because grammatical structure (is not transcendent) -" because the same language (i.e. set of sentences) can be generated by different formation rules or encyclopedia -" dependency on language and its grammar.
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X 88
Identity/logical truth/structure/Quine: Identity puts structural conception of the logical truth (as structural property of schemes) in question, because they become wrong if one inserts a different predicate instead of = -" (in logical truth each predicate must be replaceable by another).
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X 90
Identity/logical truth/structure/definition/Quine: if = is not simply interpreted as a predicate in the lexicon of the object language, but only as an abbreviation for compound sentences like (3), then the laws of identity are nothing but abbreviations of logical truths of the quantifier logic-" then the structural conception of the logical truth is saved.
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X 109
Logical truth/attitudes/propositional attitude/Quine: if we had schemes with them, we could not decide which of them are valid -" laws for attitudes should not be logical laws, because propositional attitudes are too content rich.
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X 109
Logical Truth/modality/modal logic/Quine: the modalities leave more room here than the attitudes: we can get schemes here that are valid: E.g. ~(~ p necc. p) - Also, we receive from any valid scheme another one by prefixing of necessary E.g. necc. (p or ~p) from p or ~p.
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X 127
Logical truth/Carnap: Thesis: purely linguistical, because true in every replacement from the lexicon.
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X 127ff
Logic/language/reality/QuineVsCarnap: logical truth is not purely linguistic, because evidence is as important as the translation - e.g. expression of "it is raining" when it rains -" but no logical consequences from circumstances, because true sentences follow from any sentence - all evident things are inseparable from the translation -" semantic ascent seems to speak for the language of logic -" Vs: the truth predicate shows the separation from the language -" Quine: the logic is based on the world and not on the language.
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I 133
Yet: pro Carnap: we learn the logic by learning the language -" but that’s not different from everyday knowledge.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-23