Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Searle, John R.
 
Books on Amazon
Meaning (Intending) II 49
Meaning: is not primarily intentional, not without perceptible action.
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II 203
Meaning/Searle: We define the meaning (and hence linguistic meaning) by intentional forms, which per se are not linguistic - philosophy of mind: analyzing semantic terms with deeper psychological terms > Grice.
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II 204
Meaning/SearleVsGrice: Meaning shall be defined by action and intentional states - VsGrice: he used intent, belief and desire unanalyzedly - Searle: Meaning is a form of intentionality - like Grice: Meaning will be effective.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29