Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Fodor: Signal language of the brain for internal processing - PutnamVs. Mentalese explains nothing, shifts the problem. SearleVs. Regress of homunculi. - Rorty's solution is a hierarchy of dumber homunculi.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Dennett, Daniel
Books on Amazon
Mentalese I 491
Mentalese/language of the brain/Dennett: a unified "brain language" in which the information is stored in different human brains is very unlikely, but not absolutely impossible. - And therefore, brains are something completely different from chromosomes. ((s) Why? Because the language of the brain does not exist, or because it is conceivable?)
II 161
Intentionality/Mentalese/Dennett: E.g. ambiguous description (painter) what about the corresponding action?
The actions themselves have a meaning, because they are formulated in Mentalese! Dennett: this is a hopeless answer, not because it could not be found in the interior of the brain; you can find it!
It is hopeless, because it only shifts the problem. Because supposing that there is a language of thought, where would it take the meanings of its concepts from? And how do we know what its sentences mean in our language (Dennett like Searle, like Putnam).
Mentalese/Dennett: most of what was written about the possibility of a "language of thought" presupposes that we think in a written language of thought. (DennettVsMentalese).
II 69
Mentalese/DennettVsMentalese: shifts the problem (like Searle, like Putnam).

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26