Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Fodor, Jerry
Books on Amazon
Metaphysics IV 107
Metaphysical: is the assumption: that if there is a fact about the intentional state, then it is this fact that makes the attribution match the physical facts best.
IV 110
Metaphysical/Fodor/Lepore: not metaphysical: the finding that a suitable property is assumed as defining - metaphysical: e.g. the assumption that rationality is constitutive of intentionality - e.g. that explanatory force and simplicity are constitutive of the nomological - is transcendental. E.g. Davidson s assumption: the PdN is to be rooted in the epistemic situation of the interpreter. - LewisVsDavidson: intentional attribution must not be understood with reference to the epistemic situation of the RI - Lewis instead: the principle of charity is part of our concept of the person.

J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26