Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
| |||
Metaphysics: is a theory that has the claim to ask questions and provide answers beyond our available knowledge. It is objected that even for asking questions, a knowledge of the meanings of the words used is required. This knowledge is not given when experiences or at least theories using these terms are not available. See also essentialism, metaphysical possibility._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
J. Fodor on Metaphysics - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 107 Metaphysical: is the assumption that if there is a fact about the intentional state, then it is this fact that makes the attribution match the physical facts best. IV 110 Metaphysical/Fodor/Lepore: not metaphysical: the finding that a suitable property is assumed as defining is not metaphysical. Metaphysical: e.g. the assumption that rationality is constitutive of intentionality, e.g. that explanatory force and simplicity are constitutive of the nomological is transcendental, e.g. Davidson's assumption: the principle of chartiy is to be rooted in the epistemic situation of the interpreter. LewisVsDavidson: intentional attribution must not be understood with reference to the epistemic situation of the radical interpretation. Lewis instead: the principle of charity is part of our concept of the person. >Principle of charity, >Attribution, >Belief ascription, >Mental states._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |