Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Quine, Willard Van Orman
 
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Modal Logic II 152
Modal logic/Quine: entire Modal logic is context-dependent - what is the role of someone or something? - Same level as essential properties.
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VII 151
Modal logic/ontology/Quine: instead of Venus as a material object now three objects: Venus term, morning star term, evening star term - avoiding opaque contexts: class names as objects rather than classes, numerical names as objects instead of numbers - number concept/Number of planets concept: a term is not larger/smaller than another one - reason: necessity is not satisfied by physical objects (> Hume) - Necessity/possibility: is only introduced by way of reference, not by the objects - necessity concerns relations, not objects (not existence) - Frege: "sense (meaning) of names" Quine: Problem: individuation requires analyticity and synonymy - E.g. (s) "The term Morning Star necessarily includes the appearance on the morning sky.
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VII 151f
Modal logic/Quine: makes essentialism necessary, i.e. you cannot do without necessary traits of the objects themselves, because you cannot do without quantification - QuineVsModal logic: actually there is nothing necessary to the objects "themselves", but only in the way of reference.
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VII 151
Modal logic/ontology/Quine: the condition that two names for x must be synonymous is not a condition for objects, but for singular terms - no necessity de re - Venus does not decide about morning star/evening star. - ((s) The conditions are equivalent not the objects. > necessity.
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VII 154
Modal logic/Church/Quine: quantified variables should be limited to intensional values ​​- Proposition: complex names of intensional objects - then instead of necessity operator for whole sentences: Necessity predicate is based on complex names ("propositions") - no modal logic in the narrower sense.
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VII 154
Modal logic/Smullyan/Quine: strict separation of proper names and (overt or covert) descriptions - names which denote the same objects are always synonymous (if x = y, then nec. x = y.) - In this case, sentences like (number of the planets = 9) which do not have a substitutable identity must be analyzed by descriptions rather than through proper names (Quine pro) - QuineVs: one must still consider opaque contexts, even if descriptions and other singular terms are eliminated all together.
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VII 154
Modal logic/necessity/planet example/Quine: the only hope is to accept the situation as described in (33): there are exactly x planets) and still insist that the object x in question is necessarily more than 7! (> Essentialism). - An object itself, regardless by what it is named or not named, must be considered in a way that it has some traits necessarily and others by chance! And notwithstanding the fact that the random traits stem from a way of reference, as well as the necessary ones from other modes of reference - ~nec. [p. (x = x)] where "p" stands for any random truth.
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VII 156
Modal logic/Quine: one must accept an Aristotelian essentialism, if one wants to permit quantified modal logic.
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VII 156
Modal logic/planet/Quine: the property of being bigger than 9 = the property of being bigger than 9 - but wrong: the property of exceeding the number of planets = the property of being bigger than 9 (s) New: although now the number is the same, the property is not the same - (E.g.) (x = The property of being greater than x = the property to be greater than 9) - any non-truth-functional language leads to opaque contexts.
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X 107
Modality/modal/Quine: Problem: extension-identical (coextensive) predicates are not interchangeable salva veritate.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Modal Logic



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29