## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
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Field, Hartry Books on Amazon |
Model Theory | I 85 Model theory: semantically: "all models in which A is true are models in which B is also true": B follows from A - proof theory: syntactically "there is a formal derivation of B from A". --- I 116 Model theory/Field: if one says that a logically true sentence is true in all models, a model exists in a set of objects plus the fixing which predicates (if any) of them are true in the model, which names (if any) denote these objects, etc. - "besides. attribution function" - then the truth conditions can be recursively defined - "Definition logically true: here: true for each model-". --- I 117 Kripke: with him a non-empty set of possible worlds is called actual. Definition possible/Kripke: a sentence of the form "MA" (diamond) will then be true in a model if and only if A is in at least one possible world in a model true - Problem/Kripke: in order that "MA" is logically true, A itself has to be logically true. Solution/FieldVsKripke: we do not accept a possible world" - our model is the -"acutal world portion" of the Kripkean model. --- I 121 Proof Theory: does not provide any results that could not be obtained otherwise. --- I 116 Model theory/modal logic/FieldVsKripke: unlike Kripke: without possible world - "which sentences with the operator "logically possible" are logical true?" "N.B.: Both model theories are platonic - (pure quantity theory). |
Fie I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Fie II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Fie III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 |

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26