|Possible World: entity that can be quantified over. There ist a dispute over the question whether possible worlds exist or are only assumed for purposes of proofs of completeness. See also actual world, modal logic, modal realism, realism, actualism, possibility, possibilia, quantification.|
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|Possible Worlds||IV 147
Centered possible worlds/De re/de se/Quine/Lewis: (Ontological Relativity, Propositional Objects):
E.g. a cat that is being chased by a dog wants to get onto the roof to be safe - de dicto: it wants a state that is the class of all possible worlds where it reaches the roof - Problem: cross-world identity: Question: which of the many counterparts in many possible worlds is the cat itself? - Solution/Quine: centered world: Pairs of a world and a designated time-space point in it, the desired state is then a class of centered worlds - no centered world belongs to two classes (desired and dreaded possible worlds) - QuineVs: ultimately better divided theory: here are the objects of simple settings, classes of stimulus patterns that are more complex are linguistic - Property/Lewis: corresponds to a class of centered worlds, more specifically to a property of space-time points, but also a property of cats.
Possible world/Quine/Lewis: Lewis: large particulars (concrete) - Quine: abstract entities - certain classes of classes of quadruples of real numbers - (space-time points) - Stalnaker: pro Quine: corresponds better to our everyday language: What it could have been like.
Situation/Possible world/Lewis: Thesis: there can also be alternatives within a possible world - thus distinction situation/Possible world - LewisVsStalnaker: not propositions as belief objects (objects of desire) but attitudes de se - E.g. Lingens with memory loss finds out in the book that there are two people who could be identical with him - a) on the 6th floor at Stanford - b) in the basement of a different library 3km away - two possible situations (possibilities) in the same possible worlds - solution: property instead proposition - the propositions apply to both people in the same way.
Centering assumption/Possible world/Lewis: If it was violated, worlds that differed in a non-observed way would be considered to be the same as the actual world.
Possible world/Equality/Identity/Lewis: it is an independent and difficult question whether two possible worlds that exactly match their history also match in all other aspects - e.g. in their probabilities, laws, modal truths, counterfctual conditionals - Lewis: this is not of interest here. Overall history/Supervenience: supervenes on the history of events, whatever else may in turn supervene on the overall history.
Schw I 216
Possible world/Lewis: no set of ordinary sentences - of which there are not enough in the language.
Lewis: counterparts, possible worlds are real (KripkeVs) (PutnamVs).
Possible world/Lewis: you can speak pretty freely and metaphysically guileless and without special ontological reservations about possible worlds.
Possible world save separation of object/meta languange - Truth and analyticity cannot be defined in the same language.
Definition Possible World (VsLewis): The concept of a possible world can be explained even by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds are models of the analytical sentences of a language or diagrams or theories of such models.
LewisVs: possible worlds cannot be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds exist and should not be replaced by their linguistic representations. 1) Such a replacement does not work properly: two worlds that are indistinguishable in the representative language are (falsely) assigned one and the same representation.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991