Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Field, Hartry
Books on Amazon
Possible World Semantics II 41
Property/Denotation/possible world/poss.w./Possible World Semantics/Field: E.g. "Russell is bald" is true in every world w where Russell exists (denoted by "Russell" in the actual world) and where Russell is bald (i.e. has the property for which "bald" stands in the actual world). - N.B.: "stand for": we must now understand it like this: a predicate does not stand for a set (its extension), but for a property that exists in the actual world. - Problem: relation between predicates and properties. - Problem: Properties determine extensions of the predicates, but are not determined by them - solution: within the possible world semantics: causal theory of the reference. - Problem: we are not coming into contact with all extensions of "bald" solution: property instead of extension - or the extension is determined by a property. - Then what is associated with the predicate is not its extension, but a property. - The relation can be causal or non-causal.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24