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|Proper Names||I 614
Proper names/Name/Brandom: can only be understood in terms of the sortal associated with them - e.g. you can not just point to an equestrian statue and call "it" a "lump". It depends on whether you are referring to the statue, or the lump of clay.
Name/Reference/Kripke: if it is determined that the name is used "as usual", different beliefs cannot endanger the reference - BrandomVsKripke: the concept of reference should not be assumed in order to be able to inherit an expression anaphorically - Co-typicity does not guarantee coreference! - (not even for canonically pronominal "he", "it") - in the anaphoric chain, the quote redemption principle is not applicable - BrandomVsKripke: no paradox, but we can use names in a way that is excluded by the disquotation scheme - e.g. "Cicero" (Spy): not all need to belong to the same chain, but you also do not need quasi-names (such as quasi indexical expressions (Castaneda)).
Name/Frege/Brandom: according to Frege supposedly linked with property - KripkeVs - Brandom: this is not Fregian: according to Frege, properties are part of the meaning (reference), and not of the sense - they are not immediately comprehensible - Brandom: conceptual contents expressed by names are opaque.
Definition Names/Brandom: anaphoric chains of co-typical tokenings.
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001