Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Frege, Gottlob
 
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Proper Names I 54
Proper Name/Frege: the extension is presumed. - Otherwise, the negation would be: "Kepler did not die in misery or not the name is meaningless".
II 69
The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate), but always only an object.
II 72f
Proper name (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate).
Names/Understanding/Frege: understanding a name means to know what object it denotes. Problem: names without a carriers (E.g. unicorn). - Problem: E.g. Different names with the same carrier.
V 99/100
The fact that a name stands for an object is a consequence rather than part of the fact that it has a certain sense.
Chisholm II 144f
Names/Frege: "mixed proper name": contains linguistic and non-linguistic parts: the circumstances. -Circumstances: part of the meaning of an expression. - ChisholmVsFrege: he neglects ostension.
Dum III 68f
Names/FregeVsRussell: may well have the same sense as a specific description - what is actually considered to be a representation of an object: Valencia from the air, from the ground, within a specific buildin,g on the map? - Recognition: necessary: ​​the awareness that the object falls under the concept that determines the proper identity criterion (here: "city"). - Ability for recognition instead method of picking out. - ("red": recognition, not method for red).
Frege II 69
Name/Frege: can never be a predicate - but certainly part of a predicate.
Stalnaker I 183
Names/Proper Names/Frege/Stalnaker: for him there is a mental representation, i.e. we only have ideas about something that presents itself to us in a certain way. - ((s) This can be reconciled with Donnellan’s attributive use).

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29