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|Proper Names||I 54
Proper Name/Frege: the extension is presumed. - Otherwise, the negation would be: "Kepler did not die in misery or not the name is meaningless".
The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate), but always only an object.
Proper name (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate).
Names/Understanding/Frege: understanding a name means to know what object it denotes. Problem: names without a carriers (E.g. unicorn). - Problem: E.g. Different names with the same carrier.
The fact that a name stands for an object is a consequence rather than part of the fact that it has a certain sense.
Chisholm II 144f
Names/Frege: "mixed proper name": contains linguistic and non-linguistic parts: the circumstances. -Circumstances: part of the meaning of an expression. - ChisholmVsFrege: he neglects ostension.
Dum III 68f
Names/FregeVsRussell: may well have the same sense as a specific description - what is actually considered to be a representation of an object: Valencia from the air, from the ground, within a specific buildin,g on the map? - Recognition: necessary: the awareness that the object falls under the concept that determines the proper identity criterion (here: "city"). - Ability for recognition instead method of picking out. - ("red": recognition, not method for red).
Frege II 69
Name/Frege: can never be a predicate - but certainly part of a predicate.
Stalnaker I 183
Names/Proper Names/Frege/Stalnaker: for him there is a mental representation, i.e. we only have ideas about something that presents itself to us in a certain way. - ((s) This can be reconciled with Donnellan’s attributive use).
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003