|Geach, Peter T.
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|Proper Names||I 46f
Name/Aristotle/Geach: direct reference, no parts (Aristotle: syntactically simple) (Geach ditto) - description: indirect reference, mediation of other characters.
Calculus of Natural Deduction/Gentzen/Geach: here there are "possible names" (> "introduction of existence"). - But not quantification over it. - GeachVsQuine: so he can no longer regard names as "hidden descriptions".
Names/Geach: not knowing the causal chain is important, but its existence. - The right to use a name can exist, even if one does not know that. - Russell: a proper name must name something (Geach dito). - GeachVsRussell: but then he makes a wrong conclusion: "only a name that has to name something is a name". - Just as wrong: fallacy of "what one knows, must be" to "only what must be like this, can be known".
Quasi-names/Geach: in encyclopedias, for foreign gods - (Geach pro) - Quasi-names appear only in object position after intentional verbs. - No "second order existence". - There is no identy criterion to decide whether different peoples worship the same God.
Names/Geach: whether something is a proper name does not depend on who it is given to. - Quasi quotation: is not a name.
Logic Matters Oxford 1972