Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Kripke, Saul Aaron
Books on Amazon
Proper Names I 36
Names have no sense, descriptions have a sense.
I 39
Name: different sense, the same meaning. Alexander was teacher and student... - facts are not part of the sense of the name.
I 59
Names are rigid designation expressions (descriptions are not).
I 81
KripkeVsMill: Ordinary proper names of people are not characters that have no sense.
Otherwise we could not understand any sentence in which Socrates appears if we do not know that Socrates means the individual who is called Socrates.
I 103
Description does not abbreviate the name - E.g. Even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel still refers to Goedel.
I 118
Russell: logical proper names: this: identity without empirical investigation, therefore logical proper names are the only real names.
I 136
Name for natural kinds: Gold: could turn out to be blue, but would still be gold (would retain existence).
I 145
Concepts for natural kinds: much more closely related to proper names than unusually assumed.
I 146
Kripke general names like "cat" do not express any property.
EMD II 362
Names/designate/KripkeVsWallace: not everything has to have a name - not every term is denoted - (> Frege every sentence is significant: ((s) all records with unicorn are false or without truth value).
Prior I 170
Names/Kripke: structureless - simple sentences are wrong if x does not exist.
Stalnaker I 172f
Names/Kripke: Reference is the designated object directly, without the mediation of sense - Frege/Dummett/Searle: sense is a mediator between the name and the designated object - otherwise signing out would be inexplicable - learning a language cannot be explained.

S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-30