Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Quine, Willard Van Orman
 
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Proper Names I 230
Ambiguity: The name Paul is not ambiguous, is not a general term but singular term with dissemination. - Ambiguity action/habit: ice skaters, delivery (action, object).
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I 316
Name: general term that applies only to one object - Ryle: x itself is not a property! - Middle Ages: Socrates, human, mortal: on the same level - closes truth value gaps, claims no synonymy.
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VII 12 ~
Name/Quine: always eliminated - language does not need.
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VII 75 ~
Name/Quine: Frege: must be substitutable - even possible with abstract entities.
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VII 167
Proper names/Quine: can be analyzed as descriptions - then we can eliminate all singular terms as far as theory is concerned.
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VIII 24 ~
Name/Quine: are constant substitutions of variables.
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X 48
Name always refers to only one object - predicate: refers to many - we replace them in the standard grammar by predicates: first: a= instead of a, then predicate A - the sentence Fa then becomes Ex(Ax.Fx).
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X 48
Name/Quine: it is not possible to quantify about them, so they are a different category than variables - names can be replaced by variables, but not always vice versa.
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X 124
Name/logic/Substitutional quantification/Quine: problem: never enough names for all objects of the world: e.g. if a set is not determined by any open sentence, it has no name either - otherwise E.g. Name a determination: x e a - E.g. irrational numbers cannot be traced back to integers. ((s)>substitution class).
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XI 39
Name/General term/Quine/Lauener: names are eliminated by being reconstructed as a general term. As = a - then: Pegasus/truth value: then "Pegasus flies". (Ex)(X = c u Fx) is wrong, because Pegasus does not exist. (There is no pegasus, the conjunction is wrong). (>unicorn) - logical status of a proper name does not depend on the type of introduction, but only on the relation to other expressions.
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XII 78
Name/Quine: distinguished by the fact that they may be inserted for variables.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-27