Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Searle, John R.
 
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Proper Names II 288
Names/Searle: presuppose any other representation - have no explicit intentional content.
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II 291 ff
Names: SearleVsKripke: VsCausal Theory: exaggerates analogy between reference and perception - overweights parasitic cases - presupposes omniscient observer - Meteorology baptizes future events.
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II 291 ff
Names: Mill: no connotation, only denotation - Frege: meaning of a name is detected by description.
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II 292
Names/SearleVsKripke: causal chain can only be detected intentionally: by speaker's intention - causal chain not pure, self-descriptive - baptism itself cannot be causal, otherwise successful reference explained by successful reference (circular).
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II 311
Names/meaning/reference/Searle: E.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter what his name is" - we speak of the person who has been recognized by his contemporaries - E.g. swapped spots: Identification: "the spot that causes the experience" - Variant: forgotten: "the one I was formerly able to identify as A."
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Wolf II 168
Names/Searle: meaning stays ambigious, half of the descriptions could be true - we cannot determine in advance what characteristics apply to Aristotle - (Strawson ditto) - Zink: but then we would say that we do not know the name - solution/Zink: Localisation.
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Searle V 145
Names/SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names would be "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative".
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V 145
There can be no facts about an independently identified object by facts - otherwise one is approaching traditional substance - Identification/SearleVsTractatus: objects cannot be identified, regardless of facts.
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V 245
Names/SearleVsRussell: if they should not contain any description (description), we must unfortunately assume substances. - From the supposed distinction between names and descriptions the metaphysical distinction is derived between object and properties - Tractatus: the name means the object, the object is its meaning - SearleVsWittgenstein.
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V 247
Names/Mill: have no sense - FregeVsMill: E.g. then Mt. Everest would be = Gaurisankar, not more informative than Everest = Everest - FregeVs, SearleVs - Searle: names do not describe properties of objects - identity Everest = Tschomolungma provided no other information.
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V 256
Names/SearleVsFrege: not entirely clear - E.g. morning star/evening star are actually on the border to description.- SearleVsKripke: names not rigid, otherwise like logical equivalents - Searle: names are there, because it is necessary, to seperate the indicative from the predicative function.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26