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|Natural Kinds||I 37
Description theory/natural kind/twin earth/Schiffer: no solution: -"the beings that are co-specific with such and such looking beings which I met" - then "cat" refers to both. - does not work. (see below) - belief must not be single digit, then it would not be indexed to the person - (then both had the same belief anyway).
Natural kind/belief/Schiffer: Problem: the theories of Kripke/Putnam: natural kinds are unsuitable for belief predicates - Kripke: original term "dog": "this kind of thing" - (paradigmatic instances).
Natural kind/proposition/belief/Schiffer: E.g. Tanya believes that Gustav is a dog - Problem: the proposition cannot be the content of belief, because there is no representation of the role that represents the natural kind term "dog" here - 1. possibility: that-sentence with predicate, "that" refers to property (dog) - (Classic: they are introduced directly into the proposition). - 2. Frege: Proposition does not contain dog property, but a way of counter-one, which is how Tanya imagines dog property (belief de re) - Problem: then the that-sentence does not refer to the complete content of belief, but e.g. (Em) (m is a manner of presentation of dog property & B (Tanya)) - ((s) one does not know how Tanya imagines a dog) - then (3) cannot be the content of belief: (3) - natural kind: it may be that there is no non-pleonastic language-independent characteristic of being a dog.
Natural kind/Wittgenstein/Putnam/Kripke: not only to define by observing Termini (or observable properties) - because we lack appropriate expressions for dog-like appearance and behavior. - Right: properties of acquaintance/Russell.
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987