Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Negation, philosophy, logic: negation of a sentence. In logic, this is done by prefixing the negation symbol. Colloquially expressed by the word "not", which can be at different positions in the sentence. If the negation refers only to one sentence part, this must be made clear by the position, e.g. a predicate can be denied without negating the whole sentence. In logic, therefore, inner and outer negation is distinguished by the use of different symbols._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Negation - Dictionary of Arguments
V 171 Negation/Searle: the philosophers have long abandoned the idea that there are irreducible negative sentences >Existence statement. V 219 Negation/Searle: the negation of certain sentences such as "He doesn't know if he is in pain" are simply wrong, not as is sometimes assumed, neither true nor false. >Truth value gap. But if they are wrong, does their negation not have to be true? --- IV 113 Negation/metaphor/Searle: the negation is just as metaphorical! >Metaphor/Searle. --- VII 91 Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word (for an activity that one can sensibly call "voluntary") is not again an A-word! For example: I did not buy my car voluntarily, I was forced to do so. I did not come voluntarily, I was dragged here. He doesn't know if the object in front of him is a tree. There is considerable asymmetry between A words and their opposite or negation. >"Voluntarily". VII 95 SearleVsAustin: Austin's thesis ("No modification without aberration”) does not even go over sentences: making an assertion means committing oneself to something that is the case. If the possibility that the facts do not exist is excluded, it is pointless. Austin's slogan should be reformulated too: "No remark that is not remarkable," or "Not an assertion that's not worth asserting." Negation/Searle: the opposite of a standard condition is not itself a standard condition. Therefore, no A condition is required for the utterance of a negation of an A proposition. A-phrases mark standard situations, but their negations do not. A-condition: an A-condition is normally a reason to assume that the negation of the A proposition is true. Generally, only where there is a reason to assume that a standard situation could have been a non-standard situation, the remark that it is a standard situation makes sense. >Sensible/senseless, >truth value gaps._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16