Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Wright, Crispin
Books on Amazon
Negation I 275/76
Negation/logic/truth/correctness/correct: if both truth and correctness are playing a role, there is a distinction (see above > Neg) between the
  a) proper, strict negation: turns any true or correct sentence in a false or incorrect - another negation form:
  b) negation: acts so that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly then when his argument does not reach truth.
I 276
Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal does indeed assume that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense.
        A perfectly reasonable counterproposal is, however, that A should be rather complementary to the strict notion of the former negation.
        Then, for the case that A is only correct, the valuation of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will be generally conservative.
WrightVsVs: but the (DB) carpet now throws elsewhere wrinkles
  (see Conservativeness).
I 88
Negation: Definition negation operator "Neg": "Neg A" is true if A is false and false in all other cases (e.g. with a lack of assertibility or Super-assertibility) - incorrect solution: then with low validity of A <> B: negation equivalence "Neg (P) is true" <> Neg ("P" is true)? - WrightVs: that will not work, even with "assertible" instead of "true".

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24