Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Black, Max
Books on Amazon
Newcomb’s Paradox III 160
Newcomb's Paradox/Original Version/Black: the super fortune teller was right in most cases, where he dealt with people like you - he prepared the box beforehand - when foreseeing a single choice, he has put 1 million into the closed box! - III 161 Strategies: 1) weakly dominant: "I have nothing to lose": than both boxes - Black: = "conservative argument" - 2) reckless: only one box (the closed one): recommended if the chances are great and the stakes are low - NP/Black: Problem: one of the two strategies must be wrong. - III 162 Fortune Teller: nothing depends on his character - III 170 yet the concern is that there is reason to believe that one should be duped.
III 164
Newcomb's Problem/Black: realistic variant: Playing for the entrance fee (museum) - predictive power from experience - "Most players lose" - III 165 1) skeptical attitude: why should I believe that - 2) trusting attitude: "Perhaps it is a psychological test to distract me"- then both boxes (conservative) - then I have to regard all the text as a deception - then too many uncertainties - III 166 Black: the more life-like, the more speaks against a daring strategy - daring strategy: is attractive to the extent to which you believe the whole story - Black: this corresponds to the belief in UFOs - III 168 Black: each variant (also with computers, etc.) is such that it is more appropriate to mistrust the whole story.
III 169
Newcomb's Problem/Black: behavioral evidence: opaque - interpretative evidence: = disclosed reasons: transparent- we can understand reasons, without accepting them - Strategy: masking my own type: Problem: if I am wrong, and my behavior does not influence the decision, I'm back in the uncertainty, while the arguments for dominance are still equally strong. - Free Will/Black: predictability does not endanger the freedom of will - E.g. the fact that the other person can checkmate me in two moves does not force him to do it - he could humiliate me by delaying. - Museum game: it's not about whether the apparatus predicts my behavior, but if it had predicted a deviation on my behalf.
III 173
Newcomb's Problem/Conclusion/Summary/Black: 1) Original version: overstretches the credibility: -a) by postulating the existence of a super fortune teller - b) by the fact that the generosity is not justified - 2) A rational person should suspect fraud in such a fantastic situation and safely play by taking both boxes - 3) in any more realistic variant, the motives of the narrator remain questionable - 4) a reasonable choice requires weighing the probability of the predictability against the possible fraudulent intent of the narrator - 5) although the conservative strategy (both boxes) - III 174 is definitely more secure, it could be refuted by additional information - 6) predictability: there are strong general arguments against it - the arguments in favor of the reckless strategy are too weak to apply in real life - 7) a rational person should assume the credibility of the narrator in a Newcomb situation and decide conservatively (taking both boxes).

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-27