Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Lewis, David
 
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Newcomb’s Paradox V 300
Newcomb’s Paradox/NP/Prisoner dilemma/PD/Lewis: thesis: the two are identical - it’s not about a prediction. - New theories are successful if they predict (=explain) already observed phenomena - whether they get the bigger profit is causally independent of what I’m doing now - therefore, my prediction should be causally independent of my decision. - Solution: move the prediction into the past - it is only important whether a prediction could have been made - and that it is conditional on whether I get the million. - Important argument: no one needs to develop a theory about my beliefs - whether someone puts a million into the box depends on a process which is not regarded to be a prediction of my choice.
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V 301
Newcomb’s Paradox/Prisoner dilemma/Lewis: Million only if a certain prediction process (before, during or after) of the choice justifies the prediction that I will not take the thousand - e.g. a copy (replica) of me. - Important argument: regardless if someone else makes a prediction about how I watch my replica (react to it?), the decision of my replica is still a prediction process regarding my prediction process.
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V 303
Even if coincidence prevails, it is rational to cooperate.
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V 303f
Newcomb’s Paradox/Prisoner dilemma/PD/Lewis: some: it is rational not to cooperate if the partners are just similar enough. - LewisVs: You should take the thousand - because whether you get the million it regardless of what you do. - PD/Lewis: it is rational to cooperate, because you would be ratted by others, no matter what you do yourself - (not causal).
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V 309
Newcomb’s Paradox/Lewis: Variant: E.g. Take the thousand and trade them for the possibility of a disease (not causal) - and you’re convinced that the latter is out of your control - then there is no reason not to take the thousand - even though your choice is proof of a possible disease - it is proof that there was a former state which was both favourable for the thousand and the disease. - Important argument: if the former condition exists, there is nothing you can do about it now.
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V 312
Newcomb’s Paradox/Lewis: It cannot exist for someone who knows everything about how things depend causally from him.
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V 309f
Non-causal decision theory/DT/Newcomb’s Paradox/LewisVs: favors the decline of the small benefit as rational - although this later choice does nothing to change the previous state, which favors the evil. - NP: requires a causal decision theory.
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V 315
Non-causal decision theory: only works because the beliefs of the actor allow it to function - ...+... Partition of propositions (sets of possible worlds), expected benefits.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24