Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Non-existence, philosophy: non-existence is not simply expressible for the classical predicate logic which attributes properties through quantification in the form of (Ex)(Fx) "There is at least one x, with the property F" (in short "There is at least one F"), since existence is not a property. The form "There is at least one x that does not exist" is contradictory. See also existence predicate, "There is", existence, unicorn example, pegasus example, round square, proof of God's existence._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Non-Existence - Dictionary of Arguments
Stalnaker I 55f Non-Existence/Empty Name/Meinong/QuineVsWyman/Quine/Stalnaker: (fictional Wyman)/Quine: a distinction between "there is" and "exists" (reserved for actuality). - QuineVs: existence is no predicate that introduces a distinctive property. Wyman creates the illusion of a match between Meinongians and their critics. Stalnaker: pro Quine: Existence: applies to everything, what can be quantified. Stalnaker I 55 Pegasus/QuineVsWyman/Quine: Pegasus could have existed - the round square does not. >Pegasus Example/Quine. I 65 Wyman: Thesis: contradictions are meaningless - VsWyman: Stalnaker Quine, Lewis. - - - Quine III 258 About/non-existence/meaning/reference/Quine: similar error: to say that one talks with "Zerberus" about a thing Zerberus, and then the problem arises that one "talks about nothing". Non-existence/Quine: this is not about "about". For example, what do you talk about when you say that there are no Bolivian warships? III 259 Errors: to assume that our speaking only makes sense if there are the things we are talking about. (Confusion of meaning and object under discussion). III 260 Non-existence/Possibility/meaning/significance/Quine: wrong solution: some authors think that a word for a completely impossible object is meaningless. Analogue: just as a logically unrealizable sentence is a non-sentence, it is not false but meaningless. ((s) (here sic, but otherwise mostly called senseless. QuineVs: 1. It is unnatural. 2. It is also impractical. Then we no longer have a test procedure for significance, just as quantifier logic has no decision-making procedure for universality and satisfiability. Solution/Quine: it is sufficient that words have the task of designating something. This is sufficient to express non-existence. The words have a full meaning. >Meaning/Quine. III 281 Truth Value/Existence/Non-Existence/Ontology/Logic/Quine: what truth value do sentences such as "Zerberus barks" have? (See also >Unicorn example). The answer "wrong" would be hasty. III 282 Problem: for all sentences that would be wrong, there would be a negation that would then be true! Our derivation methods prove nothing in case the object does not exist. What would have to be proved is based on an unfulfilled condition. Truth value gap/Quine: comes from the everyday language, in logic we have to fill it. And be it arbitrary. Each sentence should have a truth value (true or false). >Truth Value/Quine, >Truth Value Gaps/Quine. This was the reason for the convenient extension of the concept of the conditional in § 3,m which generally permitted a truth value for the entire conditional. We now need a similar extension for singular terms, which mean nothing. But this cannot be achieved by an all-encompassing decision. However, this is possible for simple sentences from which we derive rules for compound sentences. Def simple predicate: is a predicate if it does not explicitly take the form of quantification, negation, conjunction, alternation, etc. of shorter components. If a simple predicate is applied to a singular term that does not denote anything, the sentence in question should be considered false. Then, for example, "Zerberus barks" is wrong, because it represents an application of the predicate "[1] barks" to "Zerberus". I 429 Ideal objects: a case, with certain parallels to infinite quantities: the ideal objects of physics: e.g. mass points, smooth surfaces, isolated systems. Such objects would be contrary to the laws of theoretical physics. At the same time, however, the basic laws of mechanics are regularly formulated with reference to such ideal objects, usually with universal quantifying conditional sentences. "(x)(if x is a mass point, then...)" Consequently, the absence of ideal objects does not falsify the mechanics! Sentences of this kind remain true in meaningless ways, since there are no counterexamples._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Non-Existence
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18