Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Field, Hartry
Books on Amazon
Nominalism I 132
Theory/Nominalism/strong/weak/stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: has more consequences - if mathematical entities (mE) are to be dispensed with, a Platonist theory can have no (physical) consequences which a nominalistic (only physical entities entities) does not have.
l 159
Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: in what sense are Platonist (e.g. "direction 1 = direction 2") and nominalistic statement (c1 is parallel to c2) equivalent? Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a consequence of the first.
III 12
Nominalism/Field/N.B.: will not claim N* (without mathematical entities), but the stronger N.
III 34
Nominalism/Field: is compatible with the assumption of space-time points and empty regions -
Nominalism pro substantivalism.
III 36
Regions/Points/Field: Solution for the nominalists: individual calculus/Goodman: Regions as sums of points. - But then there are no empty regions. - The region then does not need to be connected or measurable.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25