## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
---|---|---|---|

Field, Hartry Books on Amazon |
Nominalism | I 132 Theory/Nominalism/strong/weak/stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: has more consequences - if mathematical entities (mE) are to be dispensed with, a Platonist theory can have no (physical) consequences which a nominalistic (only physical entities entities) does not have. --- l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: in what sense are Platonist (e.g. "direction 1 = direction 2") and nominalistic statement (c1 is parallel to c2) equivalent? Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a consequence of the first. --- III 12 Nominalism/Field/N.B.: will not claim N* (without mathematical entities), but the stronger N. --- III 34 Nominalism/Field: is compatible with the assumption of space-time points and empty regions - Nominalism pro substantivalism. --- III 36 Regions/Points/Field: Solution for the nominalists: individual calculus/Goodman: Regions as sums of points. - But then there are no empty regions. - The region then does not need to be connected or measurable. |
Fie I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Fie II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Fie III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 |

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25